The use of Reason by Gorgias and Plato

Disclaimer

The article below was originally written in the form of an undergraduate assignment for the Greek Open University in 2006, during a period when the author's academic skills were still under development. Although the quality of this article does not match the quality of later examples of the same author's work, it is written in a thorough manner and contains useful information to nowadays students and other readers with non-specialised knowledge; therefore, it has been proudly included on this website.

The reader needs to be warned that the original assignment, on which this article was based on, was written in Greek and was intended to be read by specialised academics. Despite the author's best intentions to present his essay in the clearest way possible, some points and arguments might still be lost in translation. The author recommends that for any unknown words or specialised vocabulary, the readers should refer to the web for additional information.

The author admits that the bibliography for this article is limited, matching the requirements of an undergraduate assignment of this level. The author did not include any additional bibliography during the translation of his work in English due to time and access limitations. It must also be noted that the original bibliography for this article was studied from translated copies in Greek; therefore, the page numbers suggested in the citations below match the page numbers of the translated copies and not the original volumes.

Introduction

This article discusses the differences between Gorgias and Plato in the relation to the use of Reason (Logos) in rhetoric. The analysis is based on three texts: the essay Encomium of Helen by Gorgias, the thesis On the Non-Existence by Gorgias, and sections 454E to 466B of Plato’s dialogue Gorgias. The article is divided in three sections. The first section discuses the properties of Reason as these are presented in the two compositions by Gorgias. The Second section discusses Plato’s approach and focuses on the connection between Reason and justice. This relationship is presented by Socrates during his conversation with Gorgias, which is recorded by Plato. The third section focuses in the use of Reason in rhetoric. It discusses the analogies employed by Socrates and Gorgias to explain the benefits of rhetoric in conjunction with the benefits of medicine and well-being.

The use of Reason by Gorgias

The essay Encomium of Helen is the primary ancient text on the foundation of rhetoric (Balla 2000, 86). Through this essay, Gorgias praises the power of Reason (Logos), which is literally the power of persuasion. According to the text, Reason is the “greatest of all rulers” (Skouteropoulos 1991, 221); it has a small and insignificant body mass; however, it is capable of achieving the most divine tasks (Skouteropoulos 1991, 221). The power of Reason can be noted in its two characteristic properties. Firstly, in its ability to control human emotions, such as sorrow, fear and lust. Secondly, in its ability to deceive people, particularly those who are unaware of the truth, and those who place importance on the erroneous and uncertain judgements of the human soul (Skouteropoulos 1991, 223).

According to Gorgias, the nature of Reason is violent: it can carry people away against their will by generating strong emotions to them, which surpass their rational judgement. The violence of Reason is equal to real physical violence (Balla 2000, 86). in the Encomium, Helen is portrayed as a person who was tricked by Paris’ Reason. Paris persuaded Helen to join him after he produced strong emotions to her. Helen could have not resited the persuasive powers of Reason; therefore, she followed Paris to Troy against her will (Gorgias, Encomium of Helen, 15-16).

According to Gorgias, the basic function of Reason is to persuade regardless if it represents the truth (Balla 2000, 87). By its persuasive powers, Reason is able to alter the inner momentum of one’s soul. Gorgias argues that the cosmologists subvert the existing beliefs on natural phenomena with the use of Reason. The judges in court are affected by the persuasive powers of the skilful Logos, although Reason does not always represent the truth. Finally, Reason can alter one’s comprehension during a philosophical debate due to the rapidity of the thoughts that are expressed via it (Gorgias, Encomium of Helen, 13).

These powers were always seen with suspicion by philosophers such as Socrates and Plato, who understood that their practical application could not always serve noble causes. In 5th century BC Athens, the ‘powers’ of Reason were embraced by various slanders, who used to take advantage of the Athenian judicial system and make profit by suing wealthy citizens. Several students of Gorgias paid generous tuition fees to study the persuasive powers of Reason. The skills taught to them by Gorgias and other Sophists of that time, were used in premeditated lawsuits with false accusations. By manipulating Reason, the slanders were able to convince the jury in their favour, and finally make profit against other citizens (Balla 2000, 84).

Gorgias never saw his students as slanders. He treated them as rhetoricians or orators. According to him, a good orator was a skilful public-speaker who was not obliged to serve the truth; instead, he was trained to use Reason as a persuasion tool. On one hand, a good orator could have used Reason to generate strong emotions to his audience. On the other hand, he could have used Reason to bombard his audience with relatively convincing arguments, until they reached to a favourable decision.

The Encomium of Helen is a text where Gorgias puts this approach into action: he uses a series ‘rational’ arguments to reconstruct the traditional accusations against Helen, who was held responsible for the Trojan war. The Encomium of Helen is a rhetoric exercise, in which Gorgias presents a series of manipulated arguments, which are likely to sound rational and convincing to the audience, in order to demonstrate the persuasive powers of rhetoric (Balla 1997, 39).

In contrast to his Encomium of Helen, the thesis On the Non-Existence by Gorgias takes a different approach and cancels the powers of Reason as these were set in the former text. It can be argued that his thesis promotes scepticism in relation to Reason and casts doubts on the approach he follows in the Encomium (Balla 2000, 87).

The type of Reason supported by Gorgias in his thesis On the Non-Existence has a philosophical autonomy, which has been previously attributed to Parmenides. Gorgias examines the views of his predecessor and reconstructs the understanding of Reason as this is perceived by the Eleatic School. By following a series of rational arguments, he concludes that the products of Reason are unreal and untrustworthy. Furthermore, he argues that there is no connection between Reason and Sense, which is used to capture meanings (Balla 1997, 39-40).

In his thesis, Gorgias supports two points: firstly, nothing has an actual existence, and secondly, intellect is unable to capture the senses; therefore, he concludes that even if one can understand something that has no substance, it is impossible to convey this to another interlocutor through Reason (Skouteropoulos 1991, 186). Reason does not present to the interlocutor the actual external object that is captured by the senses, but a projection of what the human mind believes this object might be. As Reason is unable to describe the object under consideration, its autonomous existence is under doubt. This is where the object commands Reason instead of Reason commanding the object. Had Reason its own autonomous existence, this would have been different in relation to the existence of the actual object; hence, the object that is explained by Reason does not represent reality and does not coincide with the truth (Skouteropoulos 1991, 192-3).

The rationale behind Gorgias’ approach is that the power of Reason is so ambivalent, that it matches the art of a juggler. Of course, the thesis On the Non-Existence is no proof of a detailed philosophy on Reason; instead, it consists of a technical essay, which shows that thought the ‘right’ manipulation of Reason, one could overcome the dogmas of the Eleatic and the Platonic Schools on truth and reality (Balla 1997, 42-3). For example, Parmenides insists that Beings can be described in words, while Plato also describes his Ideas in words. Instead, Gorgias introduces a division between objects and words, and casts doubts in the ability of Reason to refer and define both (Kefred 1981, 336).

A comparison of the views presented by Gorgias in both texts shows that despite the different properties attributed to Reason, there is one thing in common: Reason does not need to, and is unable to, portray the truth. If this is the case, then the obvious question is what the actual use of Reason. By contrast to the Encomium of Helen, the underestimation of the powers of Reason in the thesis On the Non-Existence undermines the broader function of rhetoric and the intention of orators to persuade their audience, particularly if their objects are unreal. This specific argument could be combined with Gorgias’ view that Reason has the ability to deceive, as this is explained in his Encomium of Helen; therefore, Reason is only part of an orator’s professional skill and can become a dangerous tool of deception, depending on the orator’s intentions.

The relationship between Reason and justice in Plato’s theory

The aforementioned views on Reason by Gorgias are noted again in Plato’s homonymous dialogue, where Socrates expresses strong disagreement to the above use of Reason. During the dialogue, Socrates audits Gorgias’ arguments and recapitulates his approach: the rhetoric art focuses on persuasion without necessarily producing knowledge (Plato, Gorgias, 454E). Reason is not to teach the audience what is just or unjust; its only aim is to persuade the judges and the jury during a trial, so that the prosecutor can satisfy his own motives for profit (Plato, Gorgias, 455). Socrates disagrees with this view. To him, Gorgias limits Reason to a single practical application. The fact that Reason does not satisfy justice means that it is also likely to promote injustice.

Socrates believes that rhetoric is taught by the sophists in order to control the decisions of the uneducated people, instead of actually educating them (Plato, Gorgias, 459A). Gorgias’ practical approach conflicts with the essence of Plato’s ethics. For Plato and Socrates, rhetoric must have a practical contribution to ordinary people, which is associated with the moral quality of their lives. Morality is achieved via studying and learning human virtues, one of which is justice. The knowledge of all virtues, which equals to true wisdom, leads to the moral improvement of the people and the broader felicity of the society (Dimas 2000, 125-6). With this in mind, a true orator must not aim to persuade his audience; instead, he must employ the powers of Reason to teach his audience what is just or unjust.

Without representing an expert’s opinion, the orator is able to sound more convincing to the audience than the real expert (Plato, Gorgias, 459A). According to Socrates, this talent is neither virtuous nor moral, as the orator misuses rhetoric to deceive the ignorant audience (Plato, Gorgias, 459A-C); therefore, the orator does not deliver justice.

Socrates also wonders if the orator can be called knowledgeable. He notes that orators express their opinion about justice, wellness and virtue without knowing anything about them (Plato, Gorgias, 459D-E). According to Plato’s theory, the knowledge of virtue equals with the knowledge of all-good (Dimas 2000, 129). Furthermore, Plato recognises three states of knowledge: plain opinion, correct opinion, and cognition, which is described as the real state of knowledge (Dimas 2000, 139-40). According to Socrates, an orator expresses plain opinion with the use of Reason; as this opinion has no moral gravity, the orator has no cognition of virtue; therefore, he is not knowledgable.

In Socrates’ view, the deeper understanding of virtue, the achievement of wisdom and the felicity of a moral life are states of human cognition that must be taught. A wise man’s goal is to guide those who are ignorant towards virtuous life. For Socrates, this guidance is not through lecturing, but through auditing an existing thesis (Dimas 2000, 128-30). During the dialogue, Socrates audits Gorgias’ arguments by wondering whether true knowledge of virtue is a precondition for the young student who wishes to become an orator. Gorgias not only accepts this precondition, but replies to Socrates that he is capable of teaching his students what is just or unjust (Plato, Gorgias, 460A-C). This statement allows Socrates to note Gorgias’ first contradiction: in the beginning of their cnversation, Gorgias claimed that he does not wish to teach moral values (ethics) to his students; yet shortly later, he appears willing to teach them what is just or unjust, which is ethics (Guthrie 1991, 331).

As the conversation unfolds, Socrates suggests that the connection between Reason and justice in achieved through the accomplishment of moral deeds. During his second audit to Gorgias, Socrates concludes that the person who is taught what is just, always acts in a just manner. Based on this principle, the orator who is taught what is just, will never act in an unjust manner; therefore, he will not harm anyone in the future. This conclusion leads to Gorgia’s second contradiction regarding the unjust use of Reason: rhetoric cannot be harmful to people if an orator is preconditioned to accomplish just and moral deeds (Plato, Gorgias, 460B-E).

According to Plato, human actions have psychological motives. Furthermore, human actions are connected to human goals. The reasons behind human actions define whether these actions are moral or immoral; therefore, the person preforming such actions must be aware of his moral motives (Dimas 2000, 132-3). With this in mind, the moral responsibility for using Reason correctly, which Gorgias passes to his students, is not the right approach. According to Socrates, a student performs the things he has been taught to perform; therefore, a student needs to know what is just and moral before acting. If Gorgias teaches motives that are unjust and immoral, then the responsibility for the unjust and immoral actions of his students lies with Gorgias (Plato, Gorgias, 461).

A comparison of the two approaches by Gorgias and Socrates shows that they differ in relation to the final objective, which defines the use of Reason. Socrates suggests that Reason is a tool, which leads humans to felicity through the conquest of virtue. Justice, which is part of virtue and morality, must be supported by, and promoted through, Reason. Gorgias suggests that Reason can be taught without moral constrains and personal responsibility; therefore, it can be used to satisfy unjust and immoral goals. At the end of the conversation, Socrates finds this approach unacceptable.

The analogies between rhetoric, medicine and well-being

In the Encomium of Helen, Grogias compares rhetoric and medicine, suggesting that they are similar sciences. The term science, as it stands nowadays, does not literally correspond to the ancient Greek word Episteme, which is a structured system of scientific knowledge. In the Encomium of Helen, it is best to suggest that Gorgias compares the similarities between the work of an orator and the work of a doctor.

As the doctor knows the effects of different treatments on the human body, so knows the orator the effects of different Reasons on the human soul. Reason has the same impact on the human soul as medication has on the human body. According ancient Greek medical theory, each medicine extracts a different combination of fluids from the human body, which are similar to what is nowadays described as secretions. Such fluids tent to either heal or kill the patient. According to Gorgias, Reason extracts a variety of feelings from the human soul, which can either cause happiness or sorrow (Balla 1997, 38-9).

Gorgias produces a set of comparisons, which link rhetoric with medicine and Reason with medical treatment; however, there is a problem in his approach, which relates to the motives of each ‘scientist’. The doctor prescribes medication to the patient with just and moral intentions, aiming to heal and save someone's life; by contrast, the orator can offer Reason as a “form of cunning persuasion” (Gorgias, Encomium of Helen, 14). With this in mind, the orator’s intentions are not always moral and just as the doctor’s intentions. It is important to note ancient doctors were sworn the Hippocratic Oath, which is an ethical commitment of conduct that is still sworn by modern medical graduates. No similar oath existed for orators.

Another comparison between rhetoric and medicine is presented in the homonymous dialogue by Plato, where Gorgias argues that rhetoric is even superior to medicine. He points out that his brother, who was a doctor, was often unable to convince his patients to undergo surgery or to follow some medical treatment. When this happened, Gorgias used to intervene with his rhetoric skills and he used to persuade the patients to follow their doctor’s advice (Plato, Gorgias, 456). With this example, Gorgias overstresses the power of rhetoric. Socrates, on the other hand, asks him an obvious question: can rhetoric be considered a real science (episteme) when it neither produces, nor aims in the production of knowledge? This answer is obviously negative, which justifies why Socrates thinks rhetoric is an art (techne) instead of a real science (episteme) (Plato, Gorgias, 459C-E).

Nowadays, the modern theoretical framework of medicine suggests that its aim is to heal a patient, provided that the patient agrees with the process. Furthermore, even if an external person influences the patient to seek medical treatment for a certain problem, the treatment is useless without a trained medical professional to monitor it.

In the dialogue, Socrates disassociates the relationship between medicine and rhetoric, and places this correlation in a different framework. For Socrates, the essence in not medicine itself, but the broader concept of well-being (euexia), which has two forms: physical and mental. Furthermore, well-being can be real, or it can even be apparent, without necessarily being real. The two sciences that offer real knowledge and well-being to the human body are medicine and physical education (gymnastics). In a similar sense, the two silences that offer real knowledge and well-being to the human soul are legislation and justice. As a real scientist, the doctor is knowledgeable to speak and to advice on issues related to physical well-being. The doctor is aware of how a real condition of well-being manifests on the human body; therefore, he is the expert to talk about it. The complete opposite of medical science is the art of flattery (kolakeutiki). With the use of flattery, a cook can express his opinion on issues related to physical well-being instead of a doctor. The cook advises without knowing the state of real well-being as he only has a vague idea of an apparent well-being. He does not show what is useful to the human body, but what is pleasant to the human taste (Plato, Gorgias, 464-465).

With his analysis, Socrates deconstructs the relationship between medicine and rhetoric as viewed by Gorgias, and parallels rhetoric with the art of cooking. His example introduces the contrast between a science that suggests the best for the human mind and body, and an art that suggests what is apparently pleasant. As there are four real sciences that offer the best to people (medicine, physical education, legislation and justice), there are four pseudo-sciences or plain arts, which offer what is apparently pleasant (Santas 1997, 585). For Socrates, rhetoric is part of flattery; therefore, it acts as a pseudo-science, aiming to replace legislation and justice. As tasty cooking tricks the human body, so tricks rhetoric the human soul (Plato, Gorgias, 465B).

The orator flatters and deceives people by keeping them away from those who have real knowledge of what is best for the people. These scholars are the legislators and the judges. For Socrates, the mutual element between justice and medicine is their corrective function; hence, he calls them correctional sciences. As medicine cures weak human bodies, so cures justice weak human souls. Justice aims on what is best for the soul, while rhetoric aims in deception by projecting what is apparently pleasant (Santas 1997, 587).

In Socrates’ view, the law consists of medication for the soul in analogy to medication for the sick human body. The person who has committed a crime must seek for punishment from the judges and the legislators with a feeling of gratification; this is the same gratification that the patient feels when seeking medical treatment from the doctor. The enforcement of law and the punishment of someone for a crime is not a painful process. Instead, it is a beneficial process for the offender’s soul. It operates as a cure, which improves the social behaviour of the offender and makes him a better person (Santas 1997, 594-5).

By comparing rhetoric and justice, Socrates has the opportunity to point out the real problem in the Athenian judicial system of his time. Various offenders would hire orators to teach them how to address the jury in an apparently convincing manner, in order to reduce their sentence or to prove their supposed innocence. If such offenders were really concerned about their personal benefit, they would have embraced their punishment as a form of psychological treatment and personal improvement. Instead, they are deceived by rhetoric and they seek for what is apparently good for them, which is avoiding the jury’s sentence. In that sense, proving one’s innocence is not always beneficial for one’s soul and does not lead to the state of mental joy (eudaemonia), which every human being is supposed to pursue.

Bibliography

Balla, Ch., 1997, The Platonic Persuasion: from Rhetoric to Politics, Athens: Polis.
Balla, Ch., 2000, ‘The Sophists’, in Virvidakis, S., Ierodiakonou, K. and Christianidis, G. (eds.) Greek Philosophy and Science: from Antiquity until the 20th Century, Volume 1, Greek Philosophy from Antiquity until the 20th century, Patra: Greek Open University, 82-100.
Dimas, P., 2000, ‘The philosophy of Plato’, in Virvidakis, S., Ierodiakonou, K. and Christianidis, G. (eds.) Greek Philosophy and Science: from Antiquity until the 20th Century, Volume 1, Greek Philosophy from Antiquity until the 20th century, Patra: Greek Open University, 121-59.
Guthrie, W., 1991, The Sophists, translated by D. Tsekouras, 2nd edition, Athens: Morphotiko Idryma Ethnikis Trapezis.
Kerfred, G.B., 1981, ‘The interpretation of Gorgias’ treatise’, in Kalligas, P. (ed.) ‘Gorgias and the Sophistic’, Deucalion (36), 239-36.
Kordatos, G. (ed), 1997, Plato: Gorgias, Library of Ancient Writers, Volume 52, translated by S. Tzoumelas, Athens: Daidalos (Zacharopoulos).
Santas, G.X., 1997, Socrates: the Philosophy in the Early Platonic Dialogues, translated by D. Vouvali and edited by A. Chatzistavrou, Athens: Ellinika Grammata.
Skouteropoulos, N.M., 1991, Ancient Sophistic: The Surviving Excerpts, 2nd edition, Athens: Gnosi.

Original Sources

Gorgias, Encomium of Helen, translated and edited by N.M. Skouteropoulos (1991).
Gorgias, On the Non-Existence, translated and edited by N.M. Skouteropoulos (1991).
Plato, Gorgias, translated by S. Tzoumelas and edited by G. Kordatos (1997).