The Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle
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The article below was originally written in the form of an undergraduate assignment for the Greek Open University in 2007, during a period when the author's academic skills were still under development. Although the quality of this article does not match the quality of later examples of the same author's work, it is written in a thorough manner and contains useful information to nowadays students and other readers with non-specialised knowledge; therefore, it has been proudly included on this website.
The reader needs to be warned that the original assignment, on which this article was based on, was written in Greek and was intended to be read by specialised academics. Despite the author's best intentions to present his essay in the clearest way possible, some points and arguments might still be lost in translation. The author recommends that for any unknown words or specialised vocabulary, the readers should refer to the web for additional information.
The author admits that the bibliography for this article is limited, matching the requirements of an undergraduate assignment of this level. The author did not include any additional bibliography during the translation of his work in English due to time and access limitations. It must also be noted that the original bibliography for this article was studied from translated copies in Greek; therefore, the page numbers suggested in the citations below match the page numbers of the translated copies and not the original volumes.
Introduction
This article discusses Aristotle’s views on morality (ethics) and human flourishing (eudaemonia) as they are presented in the first volume of his Nicomachean Ethics. The paper is divided in four sections. The first section presents the characteristics of Aristotle’s ethics and their differences in relation to other scientific disciplines. The second section discusses three different ways of life, which according to Aristotle, people tend to follow in order to achieve eudaemonia (human flourishing). The section also discusses the similarities and differences of these three ways of life in relation to Plato’s division of human characters based on their psychological motives. The third section discuses Aristotle’s critique of Plato in relation to what is considered the Greatest Good (Ypsisto Agatho). The fourth and final section explains the notion of the Greatest Good by Aristotle and its association with human flourishing (eudaemonia).
Aristotle’s views on morality
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle categorises morality as part of his broader political science (politics) (Ross 1993, 265). Aristotle’s ‘political science’ is a discipline which differs in relation to modern politics: it relates to the organisation of the functions of human societies. Aristotle’s political science is practical and treats human beings as parts of a social structure. In Aristotle’s politics, the ultimate benefit of morality is not personal, but communal, and is meant to be shared with the entire society. Society can either be defined as a large group of people or a specific political entity (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, A1-2).
For Aristotle, ethics is part of politics, which includes a variety of other disciplines, such as strategic, rhetoric and economy. Aristotle uses the term ‘architecture’ to describe his political science, confirming its teleological role. Political science and ethics bring together all other scientific disciplines, which contribute in the organisation of human societies. All disciplines aim in the moral fulfilment of the society and the communal achievement of human flourishing (eudaemonia) (Koutras 2002, 12-13).
Aristotle divides the disciplines of scientific knowledge (episteme) in two categories: practical and theoretical. Ethics aim in refining the behaviour of an individual or a group of people; therefore, their scientific application is practical. Such practical disciplines are characterised by a degree of subjectivity: their focus is human actions, which are often determined by the personal preferences of an individual. In contrast, theoretical disciplines aim in discovering eternal axioms, which are always true; the scholar is guided to these axioms through productive reasoning. In that sense, Aristotle rejects the application of the geometric methodology (his form of reasoning based on applied mathematics) on theoretical disciplines. Instead, such methodology matches practical disciplines, such as ethics. Aristotle argues that the conclusions drawn by practical disciplines are less tangible and more flexible compared to those of the theoretical disciplines. This difference is attributed the the freedom of one’s choice, which characterises human behaviour (Georgoulis 2000, 335-6).
Practical and theoretical disciplines follow a different evidentiary methodology. Theoretical disciplines are based on general assumptions, which are called principles. The rationale of the mathematicians, for example, is introduced by such principles; then, with the use of interconnected productive reasoning, mathematicians prove a certain relationship, which equals with the discovery of an individual fact. In contrast, practical disciplines are based on the direct observation of natural phenomena though the use of human senses. The senses collect data from the surrounding environment, which they process in an inductive way. Their aim is to understand the primary source (the first principle), from which their data originates. In that sense, Aristotle’s moral science (ethics) is characterised by knowing ‘what’ instead of knowing ‘why’. The latter question is to be examined by the theoretical disciplines (Koutras 2002, 14-15).
The starting point for understanding Aristotle’s morality in not the above-mentioned primary source; instead, one is supposed to reach the primary source of morality at the end of its conquest. The primary motives of morality are not cognitive axioms, but familiar events, with which human beings are accustomed through their senses. The intention to utilise such familiar events in the pursuit of morality is what makes Aristotle’s ethics a subjective discipline. Furthermore, Aristotle argues that a good education is the only precondition for achieving moral cognition. Only through proper education will the student identify his empirical data, so that he can process it though the dialectic method, and finally understand the primal source (first principle) of moral cognition (Ross 1993, 268).
Three different ways of life for the pursuit of human flourishing
Aristotle defines three ways of life, which people follow based on the degree they wish to pursue human flourishing (eudaemonia). Each group of people has a different aim, which defines the meaning of their eudaemonia; therefore, human flourishing is measured against each group’s targets.
The first group consist of people who are after physical pleasures and their ultimate goal is personal delight (hedone). According to Aristotle, such people resemble slaves and their lives resemble those of animals. Their preferences are identical to those of the Persian king Sardanapallos, who is presented as a negative stereotype of barbarity (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, A5).
The second group consists of people who willingly place themselves in the service of their city-state, just because they are after honour and public recognition. Aristotle stresses that the efforts of such people are in vain. Honour and public recognition depend on the character of the citizens who are willing to offer them to others. The people who place themselves in the service of their city-state are after recognition from citizens who are seen as virtuous; if they manage to be honoured with their recognition, this will prove that they are as virtuous as their benefactors. As a result, gaining honour is not their final objective (telos), but an intermediate stage in their pursuit of virtue. As virtue is superior to honour, any efforts to gain honour are in vain (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, A5).
The third group consists of people who devote their lives in studying and learning. Such people are after their personal improvement and the promotion of the positive features of their character. In principle, these are the only people within the three groups, who are after Aristotle’s Greatest Good, the eudaemonia. During the analysis of his third group, Aristotle interrupts his narration and introduces a fourth group of people, which is after material wealth. However, Aristotle argues that material wealth cannot be seen as a real goal in life; instead, it consists of a practical mean, which can be used appropriately for the conquest of human flourishing (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, A5).
The above tripartite division suggested by Aristotle resembles Plato’s tripartite division of human characters in relation to their psychological motives, which he explains in his Republic. According to Plato, there are three types of human characters: the ‘friends of wisdom’, who are philosophers and are motivated by their rational qualities; the ‘friends of success’, who are motivated by their impulsive instincts; and the ‘friends of profit’, who are motivated by their desires. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle adopts Plato’s divisions and incorporates them into his three groups of people, according to their ways of life. The first group of people, who are motivated by their theoretical pursuits, match Plato’s ‘friends of wisdom’. The second group of people, who are motivated by their political ambitions, match Plato’s ‘friends of success. The third group of people, who are motivated by their delightful desires, are likely to match Plato’s ‘friends of profit’, although this can also be debated (Koutras 2002, 16-17).
The above matchings require some additional thought. In Aristotle’s approach, the people who follow their theoretical pursuits are the same as Plato’s philosophers; these are the only ones who are really after the Greatest Good. As it will be explained in the following section, however, the essence of the Greatest Good and the ways of achieving it, differ in relation to the two philosophers. Again, both Plato and Aristotle would agree that the people who follow their political ambitions to gain honour and public recognition, are motivated by their pursuit of success. In his analysis, Plato sees that success is a just pursuit; however, Aristotle argues that the human actions towards success are characterised by complete vanity. Finally, Aristotle’s group of people who are after the delights of life may not necessarily match Plato’s ‘friends of profit’. According to Plato, his ‘friends of profit’ are controlled by the part of their soul, which produces desires. Such desires are connected with the pursuit of carnal pleasure (hedone), which Plato perceives as a negative concept. On the other hand, Plato’s ‘friends of profit’ are more likely to match Aristotle’s fourth group of people, who are after material wealth; however, Plato condemns material wealth as it motivates humans to pursue inferior forms of pleasure, which are carnal and not spiritual. By contrast, Aristotle does not see material wealth as a negative concept; he believes that it plays a positive role and has a meaningful contribution to the pursuit of his eudaemonia.
Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s Greatest Good
Although Aristotle is one of Plato’s students, in his Nicomachean Ethics he follows a different approach in relation to what Plato defines as his Greatest Good. Furthermore, one needs to bear in mind that Plato’s approach appears refined in his mature dialogues, which are most likely the ones that formulated Aristotle’s critique.
In the early dialogues by Plato’s, Socrates suggests that the Greatest Good is virtue. Furthermore, virtue is gained through knowledge, which according to Socrates, has the form of esoteric cognition (Dimas 2000, 130-1). Although Aristotle argues that such cognition is achievable through the study of ethics, he neither sees virtue as the final destination, nor the Greatest Good for all humans. In contrast, Aristotle believes that virtue manifests sporadically and is not an active state of being, such as eudaemonia (Koutras 2002, 16-17). In his analysis, Aristotle rejects Socrates’ view that virtue is enough to allow someone to flourish (to gain eudaemonia). To prove his point, he counter-argues that a virtuous man, who has been systematically tortured and harassed due to his virtue, is not necessarily in a state of spiritual flourishing (eudaemon) (Irwin 2005, 272-3).
In his latest dialogues, Plato discusses his Greatest Good as an absolute, transcendental and universal Idea (principle). Aristotle disagrees with this approach in a rather sarcastic manner and notes that if such Idea exists, it is highly unlikely to be applied in a mathematical relationship, which defines the rationale of his theoretical disciplines. Furthermore, Plato suggests that his Ideas are commonly shared across the Categories of Essence, Quality and Relation, which are apparent for all objects; however, Aristotle argues that this condition is false. According to Aristotle, Essence precedes Quality and Relation; therefore, there cannot be a single Idea that is likely to define all objects at the same time. In that sense, Plato’s definition of the Greatest Good cannot be a universal Idea (principle), which is commonly shared by, and applied on, all objects simultaneously. If this was the case, then there should have been a universal and commonly recognised scientific discipline (episteme) to study this Idea, which currently does not exist (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 6).
In general, Aristotle disagrees with Plato on the existence of a supreme Idea of All-Good, which can be defined on the basis of ontology. Instead, he argues that the notion of Good (agatho) is proportional to the preferences and the needs of the people who are after it. Following this rationale, Aristotle argues that there are different Categories of Good, which are pursued by the human beings at will. Furthermore, he sub-divides these Categories of Good in two groups: the Goods that are initially obtained in order to guide humans towards other higher goods; and the Goods that are complete (full), which consist of the final destination of the human pursuit. Aristotle’s Good (agatho) is not a single entity, as this appears in Plato; instead, each Good is defined by the purpose and by the preference of each human being, as this is perceived to be perfect and self-sufficient (Georgoulis 2000, 338). Aristotle recognises multiple notions of Good and rejects the existence of a catholic and generalised Idea of All-Good, which to him has by definition no essence (koutras 2000, 18-19).
In Plato’s theory, his Ideas are meant to define education and are supposed to regulate the levels of knowledge and skill obtained by humans. Aristotle presents an ironic example to point out that knowing the Idea of the Greatest Good, does not have any practical application in one’s life. He argues that a carpenter does not earn his living due to the cognition of Plato’s ontological Ideas; instead, he profits by working with his practical skills. According to Aristotle, the cognition of Good comes with the correct use of Reason (orthos logos), which should command all human behaviours and actions (Irwin 2005, 247-8).
Furthermore, Aristotle believes that Plato’s Ideas cannot regulate human education, as the main regulator of education and life in general, is nature. Nature provides the correct Reason to human beings and defines their final destination in life (telos). Although there is a catholic destination for all human beings, Aristotle does not recognise the existence of a catholic Good for everyone. In his view, there are different and separate notions of Good, which are defined by the personal goals of each individual. The successful conquest of such Goods is achieved through the application of an orthological mediocrity (mesotis) (Irwin 2005, 247-8).
Aristotle notes that despite his well-structured theory, Plato is still unable to define the essence of his Greatest Good; instead, Plato’s Idea remains theoretical, not well-elaborated and impractical. Modern scholars agree that the approaches of the two philosophers differ in relation to their focus, which is defined by their personal research interests. From his point of view, Plato defines his Greatest Good as a catholic and eternal Idea, which stands beyond the changing nature of everyday affairs. On the other hand, Aristotle views the notion of Good as multiple and practically applicable in everyday life and reality (Gigon 1991, 282-3).
Human Good and human flourishing by Aristotle
Aristotle believes that human Good (agatho) has multiple manifestations. Instead of seeing a single human Good for the entire society, as Plato does, Aristotle sees different human Goods, which vary in relation to the arts (technes) and the actions of the people who are after them. Aristotle suggests that human Goods consist of autonomous final causes; therefore, their essence is teleological. As noted earlier, he divides them in two types: the Goods that mediate in the pursuit of other higher Goods, and the Goods that are pursued for what they are. The latter Goods are perfect and once they are achieved, there is nothing further to be pursued. According to Aristotle, this second group consists of the Highest Goods. One of these highest and final goods in human flourishing (eudaemonia). Unlike all other Highest Goods that exist in nature, eudaemonia is particularly destined for the human beings only (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, A7).
All of Aristotle’s Highest Goods, are characterised by perfection and self-sufficiency. In that sense, Aristotle’s eudaemonia is perfect and can exist by itself. Furthermore, eudaemonia includes all resources that make it self-sufficient, without need to be supported by other intermediate Goods (Koutras 2002, 19). As a final and self-sufficient cause, eudaeomonia relates to the totality of human existence and not just isolated segments of the lives of individual human beings (Kontos 2000, 207).
Aristotle follows Plato’s principle of Ergo (work/action) to define the essence of human flourishing and to present it as the Greatest Good, which only belongs to the human species. To do this, he discusses the nature of the ‘per se’ human work that matches the conquest of human flourishing. In his analysis, the functions of life, the ability to grow and the perceptual abilities of the senses can be noted on every living organism in nature. The only function that belongs solely to the human species is the performance of rational actions, or the ability to act according to Reason. Aristotle specifies that for such actions, Reason masters the volition of the human soul (psyche) (Georgoulis 2000, 339-40). As a result, eudaemonia is accompanied by orthological actions, which are actions according to Reason (orthos logos). Paradoxically, although Reason is meant to control all human actions, such actions are not always subject to Reason. The same stands with human flourishing (Irwin 2005, 274-5).
The conquest of human flourishing through the pursuit of rational actions suggests that human flourishing is a spiritual Good. Such spiritual Goods are achieved due to personal volition and spiritual determination. In contrast, other Goods such as health and wealth, do not depend solely on human volition; instead, they are often controlled by external conditions and random parameters (Gigon 1991, 285). As long as Reason governs human flourishing, the latter can be the Highest Good defining the life of people who aim in knowledge (cognition) and spiritual growth.
Unlike Socrates, who sees that the knowledge of virtue is enough to lead to cognition and spiritual growth, Aristotle proposes an education system (agoge), which teaches humans how to act according to Reason (to perform orthological actions) (Irwin 2005, 237). According to Aristotle, the knowledge of Socratic virtue is not enough to guarantee human flourishing (eudaemonia); hence, a virtuous man is not necessarily joyful (eudaemon) (Irwin 2005, 272-3). Aristotle concludes that human flourishing in not the same as virtue, but another form of acting according to Reason (Ross 1993, 272).
To summarise, the essence of Aristotle’s eudaemonia consists of four features. Firstly, it is the highest of all functions, which complies to the commands of Reason. Secondly, it manifests itself actively (en energeia) and not potentially (en dynamei), which means it is a practical and not a theoretical acquisition. Thirdly, it is not the same as virtue, but it complies with the principles of virtue. Fourthly, it does not manifest sporadically in the lives of humans, but consists of a permanent state of living. According to Aristotle, the presence of eudaemonia in people’s lives demands the presence of physical wealth, which ensures the self-sufficiency of the former. Although Aristotle’s eudaemonia does not match pleasure (hedone), the latter is a natural after-effect of the former. Finally, to conquer eudaemonia one needs to start from virtue. Virtue defines the beginning of every rational human action, and the continuation of such actions leads to eudaeomonia (Ross 1993, 271-2).
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Original Sources
Artistotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by D. Lypourlis (2006).
Artistotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by B. Moschovis (1993).