The Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle

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The article below was originally written as an undergraduate assignment for the Greek Open University in 2007, during a period when the author’s academic skills were still developing. Although the quality of this article does not match that of later examples of the same author’s work, it is written in a thorough manner and contains useful information for students and other readers with non-specialised knowledge; therefore, it has been proudly included on this website.

The reader needs to be warned that the original assignment, on which this article was based, was written in Greek and was intended to be read by specialised academics. Despite the author’s best intentions to present his essay in the clearest way possible, some points and arguments might still be lost in translation. The author recommends that readers consult the web for additional information on any unfamiliar words or specialised vocabulary.

The author admits that the bibliography for this article is limited, as required for an undergraduate assignment of this level. The author did not include any additional bibliography during the translation of his work into English due to time and access limitations. It must also be noted that the original bibliography for this article was studied from translated copies in Greek; therefore, the page numbers suggested in the citations below match the page numbers of the translated copies and not the original volumes.

Introduction

This article discusses Aristotle’s views on morality (ethics) and human flourishing (eudaemonia) as they are presented in the first volume of his Nicomachean Ethics. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section presents the characteristics of Aristotle’s ethics and their differences from those of other scientific disciplines. The second section discusses three ways of life that, according to Aristotle, people tend to follow to achieve eudaemonia (human flourishing). The section also discusses the similarities and differences of these three ways of life in relation to Plato’s division of human characters based on their psychological motives. The third section discusses Aristotle’s critique of Plato in relation to what is considered the Greatest Good (Ypsisto Agatho). The fourth and final section explains Aristotle's notion of the Greatest Good and its association with human flourishing (eudaemonia).

Aristotle’s views on morality

In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle categorises morality as part of his broader political science (politics) (Ross 1993, 265). Aristotle’s ‘political science’ is a discipline that differs from modern politics: it concerns the organisation of human society's functions. Aristotle’s political science is practical and treats human beings as parts of a social structure. In Aristotle’s politics, the ultimate benefit of morality is not personal, but communal, and is meant to be shared with the entire society. Society can either be defined as a large group of people or a specific political entity (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, A1-2).

For Aristotle, ethics is part of politics, which includes a variety of other disciplines, such as strategy, rhetoric and economy. Aristotle uses the term ‘architecture’ to describe his political science, confirming its teleological role. Political science and ethics bring together all other scientific disciplines, which contribute to the organisation of human societies. All disciplines aim at the moral fulfilment of society and the communal achievement of human flourishing (eudaemonia) (Koutras 2002, 12-13).

Aristotle divides the disciplines of scientific knowledge (episteme) into two categories: practical and theoretical. Ethics aim to refine the behaviour of individuals or groups; therefore, their scientific application is practical. Such practical disciplines are characterised by a degree of subjectivity: they focus on human actions, which are often determined by personal preferences. In contrast, theoretical disciplines aim to discover eternal axioms that are always true; the scholar is guided to them through productive reasoning. In that sense, Aristotle rejects applying the geometric methodology (his form of reasoning based on applied mathematics) to theoretical disciplines. Instead, such a methodology aligns with practical disciplines, such as ethics. Aristotle argues that the conclusions drawn by practical disciplines are less tangible and more flexible than those of theoretical disciplines. This difference is attributed to the freedom of one’s choice, which characterises human behaviour (Georgoulis 2000, 335-6).

Practical and theoretical disciplines follow a different evidentiary methodology. Theoretical disciplines are based on general assumptions, which are called principles. The rationale of the mathematicians, for example, is introduced by such principles; then, through interconnected productive reasoning, they prove a certain relationship, which amounts to the discovery of an individual fact. In contrast, practical disciplines are based on direct observation of natural phenomena through the senses. The senses collect data from the surrounding environment and process it inductively. Their aim is to understand the primary source (the first principle) from which their data originates. In that sense, Aristotle’s moral science (ethics) is characterised by knowing ‘what’ instead of knowing ‘why’. The latter question is to be examined by the theoretical disciplines (Koutras 2002, 14-15).

The starting point for understanding Aristotle’s morality is not the above-mentioned primary source; instead, one is supposed to reach the primary source of morality at the end of its conquest. The primary motives of morality are not cognitive axioms, but familiar events, with which human beings are accustomed through their senses. The intention to utilise such familiar events in the pursuit of morality is what makes Aristotle’s ethics a subjective discipline. Furthermore, Aristotle argues that a good education is the only precondition for achieving moral cognition. Only through proper education will the student identify his empirical data, so that he can process it through the dialectic method, and finally understand the primal source (first principle) of moral cognition (Ross 1993, 268).

Three different ways of life for the pursuit of human flourishing

Aristotle defines three ways of life that people follow according to the degree to which they pursue human flourishing (eudaemonia). Each group has a different aim, which defines the meaning of its eudaemonia; therefore, human flourishing is measured against each group’s targets.

The first group consist of people who are after physical pleasures and their ultimate goal is personal delight (hedone). According to Aristotle, such people resemble slaves and live like animals. Their preferences are identical to those of the Persian king Sardanapallos, who is presented as a negative stereotype of barbarity (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, A5).

The second group consists of people who willingly place themselves in the service of their city-state, just because they are after honour and public recognition. Aristotle stresses that the efforts of such people are in vain. Honour and public recognition depend on the character of the citizens who are willing to offer them to others. The people who place themselves in the service of their city-state are after recognition from citizens who are seen as virtuous; if they manage to be honoured with their recognition, this will prove that they are as virtuous as their benefactors. As a result, gaining honour is not their final objective (telos), but an intermediate stage in their pursuit of virtue. As virtue is superior to honour, any efforts to gain honour are in vain (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, A5).

The third group consists of people who devote their lives to studying and learning. Such people are focused on personal improvement and on promoting their positive character traits. In principle, these are the only people within the three groups who are after Aristotle’s Greatest Good, the eudaemonia. During the analysis of his third group, Aristotle interrupts his narration and introduces a fourth group of people, which is after material wealth. However, Aristotle argues that material wealth cannot be considered a real goal in life; rather, it is a practical means to achieve human flourishing (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, A5).

The above tripartite division suggested by Aristotle resembles Plato’s tripartite division of human characters in relation to their psychological motives, which he explains in his Republic. According to Plato, there are three types of human characters: the ‘friends of wisdom’, who are philosophers and are motivated by their rational qualities; the ‘friends of success’, who are motivated by their impulsive instincts; and the ‘friends of profit’, who are motivated by their desires. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle adopts Plato’s divisions and incorporates them into his three groups of people, according to their ways of life. The first group of people, who are motivated by their theoretical pursuits, match Plato’s ‘friends of wisdom’. The second group of people, who are motivated by their political ambitions, match Plato’s ‘friends of success. The third group of people, who are motivated by their delightful desires, are likely to match Plato’s ‘friends of profit’, although this can also be debated (Koutras 2002, 16-17).

The above matchings require some additional thought. In Aristotle’s approach, the people who follow their theoretical pursuits are the same as Plato’s philosophers; these are the only ones who are really after the Greatest Good. As it will be explained in the following section, however, the essence of the Greatest Good and the ways of achieving it differ in relation to the two philosophers. Again, both Plato and Aristotle would agree that those who pursue political ambition for honour and public recognition are motivated by a desire for success. In his analysis, Plato sees that success is a just pursuit; however, Aristotle argues that the human actions towards success are characterised by complete vanity. Finally, Aristotle’s group of people who are after the delights of life may not necessarily match Plato’s ‘friends of profit’. According to Plato, his ‘friends of profit’ are controlled by the part of their soul which produces desires. Such desires are connected with the pursuit of carnal pleasure (hedone), which Plato perceives as a negative concept. On the other hand, Plato’s ‘friends of profit’ are more likely to match Aristotle’s fourth group of people, who are after material wealth; however, Plato condemns material wealth as it motivates humans to pursue inferior forms of pleasure, which are carnal and not spiritual. By contrast, Aristotle does not see material wealth as a negative concept; he believes it plays a positive role and contributes meaningfully to the pursuit of his eudaemonia.

Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s Greatest Good

Although Aristotle is one of Plato’s students, in his Nicomachean Ethics, he follows a different approach in relation to what Plato defines as the Greatest Good. Furthermore, one needs to bear in mind that Plato’s approach appears refined in his mature dialogues, which are most likely the ones that formulated Aristotle’s critique.

In Plato's early dialogues, Socrates suggests that the Greatest Good is virtue. Furthermore, virtue is gained through knowledge, which, according to Socrates, has the form of esoteric cognition (Dimas 2000, 130-1). Although Aristotle argues that such cognition is achievable through the study of ethics, he neither sees virtue as the final destination nor the Greatest Good for all humans. In contrast, Aristotle believes that virtue manifests sporadically and is not an active state of being, such as eudaemonia (Koutras 2002, 16-17). In his analysis, Aristotle rejects Socrates’ view that virtue alone is sufficient for someone to flourish (to gain eudaemonia). To prove his point, he counter-argues that a virtuous man, who has been systematically tortured and harassed due to his virtue, is not necessarily in a state of spiritual flourishing (eudaemon) (Irwin 2005, 272-3).

In his latest dialogues, Plato discusses his Greatest Good as an absolute, transcendental and universal Idea (principle). Aristotle disagrees with this approach in a rather sarcastic manner and notes that if such an idea exists, it is highly unlikely to be applied in a mathematical relationship, which defines the rationale of his theoretical disciplines. Furthermore, Plato suggests that his Ideas are commonly shared across the Categories of Essence, Quality and Relation, which are apparent for all objects; however, Aristotle argues that this condition is false. According to Aristotle, Essence precedes Quality and Relation; therefore, there cannot be a single Idea that is likely to define all objects at the same time. In that sense, Plato’s definition of the Greatest Good cannot be a universal Idea (principle), which is commonly shared by, and applied to, all objects simultaneously. If this were the case, then there should have been a universal and commonly recognised scientific discipline (episteme) to study this Idea, which currently does not exist (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 6).

In general, Aristotle disagrees with Plato about the existence of a supreme Idea of All-Good, which can be defined ontologically. Instead, he argues that the notion of Good (agatho) is proportional to the preferences and needs of those who pursue it. Following this rationale, Aristotle argues that there are different Categories of Good that human beings pursue at will. Furthermore, he subdivides these Categories of good into two groups: the Goods that are initially obtained to guide humans towards other higher goods, and the Goods that are complete (full), which constitute the final destination of human pursuit. Aristotle’s Good (agatho) is not a single entity, as this appears in Plato; instead, each Good is defined by the purpose and by the preference of each human being, as this is perceived to be perfect and self-sufficient (Georgoulis 2000, 338). Aristotle recognises multiple notions of Good and rejects the existence of a catholic and generalised Idea of All-Good, which, to him, has, by definition, no essence (Koutras 2000, 18-19).

In Plato’s theory, his Ideas are meant to define education and to regulate the levels of knowledge and skill humans attain. Aristotle presents an ironic example to point out that knowing the Idea of the Greatest Good does not have any practical application in one’s life. He argues that a carpenter does not earn his living through the cognition of Plato’s ontological Ideas; instead, he profits by using his practical skills. According to Aristotle, the cognition of Good comes with the correct use of Reason (orthos logos), which should command all human behaviours and actions (Irwin 2005, 247-8).

Furthermore, Aristotle believes that Plato’s Ideas cannot regulate human education, as the main regulator of education and life in general is nature. Nature provides the correct Reason to human beings and defines their final destination in life (telos). Although there is a catholic destination for all human beings, Aristotle does not recognise a catholic Good for everyone. In his view, there are distinct notions of Good, defined by each individual's personal goals. The successful conquest of such Goods is achieved through the application of an orthological mediocrity (mesotis) (Irwin 2005, 247-8).

Aristotle notes that, despite his well-structured theory, Plato is still unable to define the essence of his Greatest Good; instead, Plato’s Idea remains theoretical, poorly elaborated, and impractical. Modern scholars agree that the approaches of the two philosophers differ in terms of their respective foci, defined by their personal research interests. From his point of view, Plato defines his Greatest Good as a universal and eternal Idea that stands beyond the changing nature of everyday affairs. On the other hand, Aristotle views the notion of Good as multiple and practically applicable in everyday life and reality (Gigon 1991, 282-3).

Human Good and Human Flourishing by Aristotle

Aristotle believes that human Good (agatho) has multiple manifestations. Instead of seeing a single human Good for the entire society, as Plato does, Aristotle sees different human Goods, which vary in relation to the arts (technes) and the actions of people who pursue them. Aristotle suggests that human Goods consist of autonomous final causes; therefore, their essence is teleological. As noted earlier, he divides them into two types: the Goods that mediate in the pursuit of other higher Goods, and the Goods that are pursued for what they are. The latter Goods are perfect, and once they are achieved, there is nothing further to be pursued. According to Aristotle, this second group consists of the Highest Goods. One of the highest and final goods in human flourishing (eudaemonia). Unlike all other Highest Goods that exist in nature, eudaemonia is particularly destined for human beings only (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, A7).

All of Aristotle’s Highest Goods are characterised by perfection and self-sufficiency. In that sense, Aristotle’s eudaemonia is perfect and can exist by itself. Furthermore, eudaemonia includes all resources that make it self-sufficient, without the need for support from other intermediate Goods (Koutras 2002, 19). As a final and self-sufficient cause, eudaeomonia concerns the totality of human existence rather than isolated segments of individual human lives (Kontos 2000, 207).

Aristotle follows Plato’s principle of Ergo (work/action) to define the essence of human flourishing and to present it as the Greatest Good, which only belongs to the human species. To do this, he discusses the nature of the ‘per se’ human work that matches the conquest of human flourishing. In his analysis, the functions of life, the ability to grow, and the senses' perceptual abilities are evident in every living organism. The only function that belongs solely to the human species is the performance of rational actions, or the ability to act according to Reason. Aristotle specifies that for such actions, Reason masters the volition of the human soul (psyche) (Georgoulis 2000, 339-40). As a result, eudaemonia is accompanied by orthological actions, which are actions according to Reason (orthos logos). Paradoxically, although Reason is meant to control all human actions, such actions are not always subject to Reason. The same stands with human flourishing (Irwin 2005, 274-5).

The conquest of human flourishing through the pursuit of rational actions suggests that human flourishing is a spiritual Good. Such spiritual Goods are achieved due to personal volition and spiritual determination. In contrast, other Goods such as health and wealth, do not depend solely on human volition; instead, they are often controlled by external conditions and random parameters (Gigon 1991, 285). As long as Reason governs human flourishing, the latter can be the Highest Good, defining the life of people who aim for knowledge (cognition) and spiritual growth.

Unlike Socrates, who sees that knowledge of virtue is enough to lead to cognition and spiritual growth, Aristotle proposes an education system (agoge) that teaches humans how to act according to Reason (to perform orthological actions) (Irwin 2005, 237). According to Aristotle, the knowledge of Socratic virtue is not enough to guarantee human flourishing (eudaemonia); hence, a virtuous man is not necessarily joyful (eudaemon) (Irwin 2005, 272-3). Aristotle concludes that human flourishing is not the same as virtue, but another form of acting according to Reason (Ross 1993, 272).

To summarise, the essence of Aristotle’s eudaemonia consists of four features. Firstly, it is the highest of all functions, which complies with the commands of Reason. Secondly, it manifests itself actively (en energeia) rather than potentially (en dynamei), indicating a practical rather than a theoretical acquisition. Thirdly, it is not the same as virtue, but it complies with the principles of virtue. Fourthly, it does not manifest sporadically in human lives but constitutes a permanent state of living. According to Aristotle, the presence of eudaemonia in people’s lives requires physical wealth, which ensures their self-sufficiency. Although Aristotle’s eudaemonia does not match pleasure (hedone), the latter is a natural after-effect of the former. Finally, to achieve eudaemonia, one must start with virtue. Virtue defines the beginning of every rational human action, and the continuation of such actions leads to eudaeomonia (Ross 1993, 271-2).

Bibliography

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Kontos, P., 2000, ‘Ethics and Politics’, in Politis, B. and Kontos, P. ‘The Philosophy of Aristotle’, in Virvidakis, S., Ierodiakonou, K. and Christianidis, G. (eds.), Greek Philosophy and Science: from Antiquity until the 20th Century, Volume 1, Greek Philosophy from Antiquity until the 20th century, Patra: Greek Open University, 206-15.
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Ancient Sources

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by D. Lypourlis (2006).
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by B. Moschovis (1993).