The ideal Emperor and foreign ruler in the Strategikon by Kekaumenos

Disclaimer

The article below was originally written as an undergraduate assignment for the Greek Open University in 2003, during a period when the author’s academic skills were still developing. Although the quality of this article does not match that of later examples of the same author’s work, it is written in a thorough manner and contains useful information for students and other readers with non-specialised knowledge; therefore, it has been proudly included on this website.

The reader needs to be warned that the original assignment, on which this article was based, was written in Greek and was intended to be read by specialised academic historians. Despite the author’s best intentions to present his essay in the clearest way possible, some points and arguments might still be lost in translation. The author recommends that readers consult the web for additional information on any unfamiliar words or specialised vocabulary.

The author admits that the bibliography for this article is limited, as required for an undergraduate assignment of this level. The author did not include any additional bibliography during the translation of his work into English due to time and access limitations. It must also be noted that the original bibliography for this article was studied from translated copies in Greek; therefore, the page numbers suggested in the citations below match the page numbers of the translated copies and not the original volumes.

Introduction

This article discusses the profiles of the ideal Byzantine Emperor (Autokrator) and the ideal foreign ruler (Toparches) as presented in the Strategikon by Kekaumenos. The author of the book lived sometime between the second and third quarter of the 11th century AD; the actual Strategikon, however, is most likely written between AD 1075 and 1078 (Strategikon, 16-16). This is an important transitional period for the Byzantine Empire, characterised by significant controversy over the handling of state affairs (Strategikon, 9).

Even though this specific book belongs to the category of practical manuals on military tactics, commonly written throughout the Middle Byzantine period and called Taktika (Tactics) or Strategika (Strategics), Kekaumenos does not confine his discussion and advice to military issues (Strategikon, 12-13). By contrast, he wishes to produce a text that offers useful advice to his children (Strategikon, 240); therefore, next to some practical advice of military nature, he writes about private life and household affairs, and between paragraphs 7 and 91, he offers advice to the Byzantine Emperors and foreign rulers.

To address the characteristics of the ideal Emperor and foreign ruler, this article is divided into five sections. The first section discusses the changes the Byzantine imperial ideal underwent during the 10th and 11th centuries AD and the reasons behind them. The second section discusses historical events that preceded the writing of the Strategikon and are useful for understanding the 11th-century AD socio-political context. The third section discusses the qualities Kekaumenos believed should characterise an ideal Emperor and an ideal foreign ruler; it also discusses the deviation between these qualities and what was happening in reality during his time. The third section addresses the nature of the social values Kekaumenos projects as ideal and the chronological framework in which they are situated. The fourth section presents the reasons why Kekaumenos supported these values and explains the aims he expected his Strategikon to achieve. In the final section, there is a brief mention of the historical events that followed the period after Kekaumenos, including a short discussion on the changes that the Byzantine ruling class underwent at the beginning of the 12th century AD.

Important changes in the Imperial ideal before the 11th century AD

In the Byzantine Empire, one of the most common beliefs was that the Emperor’s power derived directly from God. Ordinary people were thought to be unable to choose their own rulers, while hereditary rule was thought to bring in power those who were inexperienced and incompetent. For this reason, it was believed that the Emperor was sent by God as a unique human being, brought to life with one and only cause: to rule. Such a human being was not expected to be influenced by ‘earthly matters’ and was supposed to rule as a sole monarch under divine consent. In case a ruler made bad decisions, it was believed that he would be judged only by God himself, according to the standards of the power God had entrusted to him (Guillou 1996, 119-20).

The notion that the imperial power had divine origins started to decline after the 9th century AD. After Emperor Theophilos convicted the murderers of his predecessor and grandfather, Leon the Armenian, in AD 829, the legal term ‘rule by hereditary right’ appeared for the first time in the Byzantine chronicles. This institution was further transformed during the period of the Macedonian Dynasty (AD 867-1056), when the imperial power was legitimised through the consent of the ruling family (Guillou 1996, 122).

Furthermore, during the reign of Nikephoros Phokas (AD 963-969), another change occurred in the understanding of imperial status. Until that time, the Byzantine Emperor of previous centuries was portrayed as a chosen-by-God peacekeeper, characterised by righteousness, charity, generosity, purity, loyalty and piety. From the end of the 10th century AD, however, this notion started to change. The Emperor began to stand out for his military virtue, his prowess in battle and his aristocratic descent. This notion gradually took root among the Byzantines during the 11th century AD, a period characterised by severe pressure from the Empire’s external enemies. Furthermore, due to their increasing political powers, it was the rural military aristocracy of the 11th century who imposed the model of the Warrior-Emperor (Penna 1999, 46-7).

The historical events of the 11th century AD and the internal crisis

The Strategikon by Kekaumenos presents the typical image of the Byzantine Empire of the 11th century AD. The profile of the Warrior-Emperor matches that of Basil II the Porphyrogenitus (AD 967-1025), the most influential figure of the 11th century. By continuing the military victories of his two predecessors, Nikephoros II Phokas (AD 963-969) and Ioannis Tsimiskis (AD 969-976), Basil II consolidated the power of the Byzantine Empire and secured its frontiers against enemy attacks. Basil II subdues the Bulgarians in 1018; he conquers North Syria and Armenia; and finally, he signs important peace treaties with the Serbians and the Croats (Strategikon, 9-10)

His focus in internal affairs is supporting farmers. He forces the wealthy landlords to pay the delayed taxes of the poor farmers, while his administration moves away from supporting the urban populations and focuses on the Empire’s rural areas, the so-called Themata (θέματα). The reason this shift occurs is that the rural Themata supply the government with sufficient military personnel and pay the largest share of the state’s taxation (Angold 1997, 60-3).

Unfortunately, the style of government practised by Basil II is so peculiar that only he can control the state in such an effective manner. His successors face great difficulty in maintaining progress, and therefore, after Basil’s death, the Empire’s decline begins rapidly (Angold 1997, 61).

In 56 years, there were 11 different emperors on the Byzantine throne, and none managed to maintain the political stability achieved by Basil II. Political power gradually passes into the hands of a highly educated minority, who are members of the imperial bureaucracy based at the Empire’s capital. The army units stationed in the rural districts are gradually neglected, while an increasing number of foreign mercenaries are introduced into the Byzantine army. The maintenance of foreign mercenaries increases the state’s budget, leading to higher taxation of rural areas. At the same time, the Empire’s external enemies raid from all directions, causing severe devastation to the agricultural economy (Strategikon, 10-12).

The period between AD 1050 and 1075 is characterised by catastrophic military defeats and territorial losses. The Seljuks invaded from the East, and in AD 1071, they defeated the army of Romanos IV Diogenes at Manzikert. The same year, the Norman army of Robert Guiscard conquered the Byzantine territories of Southern Italy. Finally, invaders from the North reach the walls of Constantinople (Kazdan & Warton-Epstein 1997, 60).

The ideal Emperor of Kekaumenos

The period between AD 1075 and 1078, during which the Strategikon was written, was marked by administrative crisis and instability in the Byzantine Empire. The large number of Emperors and the continuous successions on the Byzantine throne are primarily responsible for the existing situation. Internal political rivalries in Constantinople undermine and dissolve the rural Themata, leaving them soon an easy target for foreign invaders. Living in such an environment, Kekaumenos writes a series of practical advice for his children, though it is also addressed to the Emperor and other foreign rulers.o Kekaumenos, the first principle characterising an ideal Emperor is to rule in justice. He suggests that the Emperor is the law itself; therefore, all people must obey his commands. In return, the Emperor is subject to the divine laws of God, just as all humans; therefore, he cannot rule without piety and cannot introduce laws disrespectful to his people (Strategikon, 224). Kekaumenos supports the idea that an Emperor’s deeds must reflect gratitude, truth and justice. Such characteristics are associated with the Emperors of earlier periods, who ruled before Nikephoros Phokas, when the model of the Warrior-Emperor had not yet been established.

The investigation of false accusations and the rewarding of truth are additional characteristics which support the judicial role of an Emperor and promote his righteous government. Even when the throne is under threat, the Emperor must conduct his investigations in secret and bring the conspirators to trial only when his evidence against them is strong (Strategikon, 246). Bearing in mind that during previous periods the Byzantine throne had passed into the hands of eleven different Emperors, it is evident that questioning and undermining rulers, conspiracies, and attempts to dethrone them were common phenomena.

Rewarding and promoting capable servants is another piece of advice that Kekaumenos considers important. According to him, the mistresses and hypocrites surrounding the Emperor are not supposed to be offered public offices. Such offices are supposed to be given to capable men instead, who gain their employees’ respect and maintain discipline within the office’s hierarchy (Strategikon, 246-8). This suggestion raises questions about the ineffectiveness of the Byzantine state’s mechanisms, in which people without the skills to hold the positions they occupied were favoured by the right officials.

Accepting critique and appreciating honesty from those who dare to speak the truth to the Emperor are other positive characteristics of the ideal ruler. The ruler should not only avoid those who offer him flattering words, but he should prefer friends who offer him constructive critique (Strategikon, 264-68).

Caring for the soldiers and resolving the army’s administrative problems fairly are two important tasks that ensure the troops’ loyalty to the Emperor. In exchange, the Emperor should not deprive the Roman and foreign (mercenary) soldiers of any necessary supplies; he should provide sufficient food for all men and their animals and pay them their salaries in full, so that they will always be satisfied and carry on serving him (Strategikon, 248). Additionally, foreign mercenaries should never be offered higher positions in the army. Even the most qualified among them should be offered positions with restricted powers, as any excessive generosity is likely to make them greedy (Strategikon, 250-6).

Although Kekaumenos claims that “the navy is the glory of Romania” (Romania or Ρωμανία refers to the name of the Eastern Roman Empire), he admits cases of bribery among the higher ranks of naval officers. Later, he mentions the incompetence of naval commanders and cites cases of pillaging and piracy linked to the Byzantine navy’s inefficiency (Strategikon, 268-72).

It is evident that Kekaumenos places great importance on the Emperor’s management of the armed forces, particularly during a period of continuous wars and external threats. From the 10th century AD onwards, the Byzantine army depended heavily on foreign mercenaries and other professional troops, such as the heavy cavalry of the Kataphraktoi (Κατάφρακτοι) (Kazdan & Warton-Epstein 1997, 121-2). Kekaumenos believes that the coexistence of domestic and foreign troops in the army makes sense only if both are treated as professional soldiers and are paid the same salary. The small numbers of conscripted domestic troops, the so-called national army, and their inability to protect the Empire’s borders led to the introduction of mercenaries and to greater diversity in the army during the 11th century AD (Kazdan & Warton-Epstein 1997, 265-6).

The author of the Strategikon neither refers to the Emperor’s participation in battles nor speaks of his military courage, which was an essential characteristic of leaders at the time (Kazdan & Warton-Epstein 1997, 181). Despite his descent from a military family, Kekaumenos believes that the Emperor should rule in justice, internal purity, and logical thought, rejecting the role model of the Warrior-Emperor, which was popular during the 11th century AD.

The author’s references to the navy suggest that, during the 11th century AD, the administration, maintenance, and equipment of the fleet were no longer among the state’s first priorities. In fact, the state’s greatest efforts were devoted to accommodating the army’s needs, probably because all the assaults on the Byzantine Empire during this period were land-based. Furthermore, the navy’s undermining was the main reason for the rise of the rural military aristocracy at the end of the century, which was closely associated with the army.

Another piece of advice offered to the Emperor is that he should not deceive the towns, foreign regions, or the army itself. Every person in the Empire needs to feel the Emperor as a father, and in return, the Emperor needs to act under the fear of God. Kekaumenos points out the extent of unfair taxation, the continuously rising taxes, and the newly introduced contributions, which he describes as strange and unprecedented inventions aimed at gathering more and more money for the state (Strategikon, 256-8). Such practices were quite common at the time for increasing the state’s income, and Kekaumenos repeatedly raises the issue of excessive and unfair taxation across different chapters of his volume (1).

The tax collectors of the 10th and 11th centuries were private individuals who bought their offices and titles from the state in exchange for money and held them for a specific period. They collected the state’s legal taxes, then added their own fees. For Kekaumenos, tax collectors try to make as much profit as possible by forcing taxpayers to pay large sums, a significant fraction of which ends up in their own chests (Strategikon, 194). According to Kekaumenos, the Emperor is obliged to control the tax collectors and limit their profiteering by protecting his own citizens from such injustice.

Controlling and combating injustice is not supposed to be limited to the senior state officials. The author goes even further, urging the Emperor to ensure that neither his relatives nor his friends have the liberty of harming other citizens (Strategikon, 258-62). He portrays the Emperor as an example for all, and reminds him that in order to govern properly, he has to develop four basic qualities: mental prowess, justice, wisdom and prudence (Strategikon, 262) (2).

Given Kekaumenos’s persistent writing on fair rule and a battle against injustice and corruption, one can imagine that the state’s mechanisms during the 11th century AD operated without any control. The Emperors had probably lost full control of the state, leading to the collapse of the traditional monarchy that had existed for a few centuries.

Kekaumenos suggests that the Emperor ensure the capital city is prepared to face any dangers. There should be sufficient food supplies, weapons, and siege engines to be used in the event of an external threat (Strategikon, 264). It is interesting that, when the Strategikon was written, Constantinople had never faced a siege by a foreign enemy. It is possible that Kekaumenos predicts a future attack on the capital by a powerful enemy, though another explanation for this kind of advice exists. The example of Michael V, who was violently removed from the throne, in conjunction with advice that the Emperor must never trust his powers and authority so much (Strategikon, 264), all point out that Kekaumenos is perhaps afraid of an internal revolt in the future, and the siege of the capital city by friendly troops. Internal threats were a reality that bothered all rulers of the 11th century. Even in earlier periods, Basil II faced a revolt in Asia Minor in AD 989, which was planned by the aristocratic families of Skleros and Phokas (Angold 1997, 56).

Finally, Kekaumenos points out that the rural areas of the Byzantine Empire are significantly neglected; therefore, the Emperor is obliged to visit the citizens of isolated areas, listen to them, resolve their problems, and ensure their peaceful lives (Strategikon, 272-5). This is a strong projection of the peace-keeping Emperor as a role model. When the Strategikon was written, many rural areas were cut off from the central government. This isolation invited enemies to the Empire’s borders and also generated internal political imbalance.

The ideal foreign ruler (Toparches)

Kekaumenos uses the term Toparches to refer to any foreign ruler who commands a territory bordering the Byzantine Empire (Strategikon, 98). In his opinion, the ideal foreign ruler must always keep his territory under his own personal rule. This means that instead of allowing the Byzantine Emperor to buy his land for money, he must establish his own authority and not allow himself or his people to become the Emperor’s slaves (Strategikon, 278-280).

He encourages him not to visit the Emperor frequently and not to seek his gifts. Many Emperors take advantage of such behaviour and, when given the right opportunity, seize control of foreign rulers’ countries (Strategikon, 276-280).

According to Kekaumenos, it is normal for a foreign ruler to visit the Byzantine capital city “to kneel” before its churches and the Emperor (Strategikon, 276-280). Here, the verb “to kneel” has a dual meaning: first, it denotes the act of religious worship, during which a foreign Christian ruler is expected to visit Constantinople’s churches and to kneel before the holy building, or, more likely, before its holy icons. Secondly, it is used to describe the respect and submission expressed by kneeling before the Byzantine Emperor, who is believed to be chosen by God. In any case, this statement reflects the popular Byzantine belief that their own Emperor is by far superior to any other ruler. Kekaumenos chooses his words carefully and purposely stresses the different status of an Emperor and a Toparch.

As his final advice, Kekaumenos suggests that a foreign ruler should maintain peaceful relationships with all his neighbouring foreign rulers, probably referring to other foreign Toparches. He advises him to offer hospitality to them, while at the same time protecting his own country to enjoy peace (Strategikon, 284-6). Such advice would have had a practical effect on the Byzantine Empire too, as on many occasions the Empire’s foreign neighbours served as protective shields against further inland invaders.

All of Kekaumenos’ admonitions to the foreign ruler match a miniature profile of his ideal Byzantine Emperor. It can be noted that, even though Kekaumenos is trying to advise the foreign ruler as someone standing outside the Empire (Strategikon, 276), in reality, he is only projecting the basic attributes of an ideal ruler as the Byzantines viewed their own ruler.

Kekaumenos lives and writes at a time of rapid, subsequent changes. The Byzantine Empire’s borders are continually shrinking, while there is a constant succession of Emperors who rule for only a short time. This fragile situation does not at all remind him of the security and stability that imperial status once offered the Byzantine people. Incapacity in the state administration, injustice, indiscretion, social inequality, unrest, and loss of faith in the army were the most common daily problems of the Byzantine Empire during the 11th century AD.

From his point of view, the author does not criticise the Emperor’s decisions. True to earlier social standards, he believes that if the Empire’s enemies are prospering while the Byzantine people are suffering, this is only because it is the will of God, not because of the Emperor’s own mistakes (Strategikon, 136).

One could argue that, through his advisory text, Kekaumenos has no apparent reason to address an Emperor or a foreign ruler. In fact, it is highly unlikely that such people would have had a chance to read his work. If this is so, then could it be possible that Kekaumenos aspired to see his sons in such political positions? Although this may be the case, it is more likely that the author incorporated such political advice into his Strategikon, expecting it to be passed on to a future ruler willing to preserve the imperial ideas that prevailed in previous centuries.

Through his advice, Kekaumenos is trying to revert the imperial ideal to a role model that existed before the 10th century AD. The loss of prosperous rural lands that once belonged to the Empire, in conjunction with the financial cost of the wars, only proved to him that the role-model of the Warrior-Emperor made no sense any more. By contrast, the state needed a charismatic ruler who was meant to be just, kind and generous, and whose divine authority was to be recognised by everyone, including foreign leaders. Such an Emperor would have used his judgement correctly to fight injustice, restore peace, and normalise the Empire’s turbulent course.

Epilogue

Despite Kekaumenos’ honest advice and the positive effects he would have expected them to have on the Byzantine administration, the reality of the following years is completely different. During the late 11th century AD, urban political elements infiltrated the Empire’s government. In response, the highest military elites from the rural areas of the Byzantine Empire consolidate their position in the government by any means available. They form a powerful group of family alliances, bound together through arranged marriages, and build a faction around the Komnenian Dynasty. The Komnenian faction monopolises the highest military and administrative positions in the government. The consolidaThe consolidation of power by a small yet dominant group of landlords and high-ranking military officers excludes several power groups from the government that played important roles in the past, such as the eunuchs and the mercenaries. Members of the state’s bureaucracy, the Senators and the older political elite are now treated as socially inferior (Kazdan & Warton-Epstein 1997, 116-8). The Komnenian Dynasty manages to get rid of every unwanted official who has political influence and who once stood next to the previous Emperors. Unfortunately, the ideal image of the God-chosen and just Emperor promoted by Kekaumenos never appears again. Instead, the new imperial model is based on hereditary succession and is exclusively controlled by the military aristocracy and the Komnenian faction.

The 12th century AD, which follows the above events, is regarded as a period of social and political decay for the Byzantine Empire. This decay leads to several of the greatest defeats in Byzantine history, which damage the Empire’s prestige forever. In 1178, the Seljuks defeated the Byzantines at the Battle of Myriokephalon; in 1184, the Normans conquered Dyrrachion and Thessaloniki; and the Bulgarians revolted during the decade following 1180. The tragic epilogue of this decay is the fall of Constantinople to the hands of the ‘Latin’ troops of the 4th Crusade in 1204 (Kazdan & Warton-Epstein 1997, 59).

Notes

1. Of course, the same unfair taxation practices continue to this day; therefore, this piece of information is unlikely to surprise any readers of the Strategikon.
2. Even though wisdom and prudence often appear as synonyms in English, in the original Strategikon, written in medieval Greek, these two words have subtle differences in meaning.

Bibliography

Angold, M., 1997, The Byzantine Empire between 1025 and 1204, translated by Kargianioti, E., Athens: Papadimas.
Penna, B., 1999, ‘Byzantine institutions’, in Penna, B. (ed.) Hellenic History, Volume 2, Byzantium and Hellenism, Patra: Greek Open University, 21-70.
Guillou, A., 1996, The Byzantine Civilisation, translated by Ontoricco, P. & Tsochandaridou, S., Athens: Ellinika Grammata.
Kazdan, A.P. & Warton-Epstein, P., 1997, The Changes in the Byzantine Culture during the 11th and 12th Centuries, translated by Pappas, A., Athens: Morphotiko Idryma Ethnikis Trapezis.
Tsougarakis, D. (ed.), 1996, Kekaumenos: Strategikon, Athens: Kanakis.