The universal concepts in Nominalism and Empiricism
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The article below was originally written in the form of an undergraduate assignment for the Greek Open University in 2007, during a period when the author's academic skills were still under development. Although the quality of this article does not match the quality of later examples of the same author's work, it is written in a thorough manner and contains useful information to nowadays students and other readers with non-specialised knowledge; therefore, it has been proudly included on this website.
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Introduction
This article discusses the philosophical debate on the existence of universal concepts and the way this issue was approached by some late medieval and post-medieval philosophers. The discussion is divided in four sections. The first section introduces Aristotle’s legacy in medieval European philosophy and his views on the existence of universal (‘catholic’) concepts until the rise of Nominalism. The second section discusses the existence of universal concepts according to Nominalism, and more specifically in relation to the views by William of Ockham (AD 1285-1347). The third section examines the impact of William of Ockham on Empiricism during the 17th and 18th centuries. The existence of universal concepts in Empiricism is discussed in two sub-sections; the first one presents the views by John Locke (AD 1632-1704) and the second one presents the views by George Berkeley (AD 1734-1753). A summary of the above views and some conclusions are presented in the final section of this of this paper.
The legacy of Aristotle
The philosophical discussion on the existence of universal concepts goes back to Aristotle and his views on the existence of generic (or ‘catholic’) meanings categories. In the Greek language, the words concept, notion and meaning have similar interpretations. Aristotle viewed all concepts as sensible meanings, which he categorised in two broader groups. The first group related to the universal concepts, which he described as “catholou ennoies” (‘catholic’ concepts), and the second group related to the individual concepts, which he described as “cathecaston ennoies” (individual concepts). According to Aristotle, natural reality consisted of individual concepts, which represented the true essence of nature. These individual concepts unified under generic meaning categories, which were Aristotle’s universal or ‘catholic’ concepts. Aristotle’s studies focused on the individual concepts, as these were the only ones, which defined the essence of our cosmos. In relation to this point, Aristotle’s theory contrasted with Plato’s approach, who understood natural reality through a different system of generic or universal concepts. Plato used to name them Ideas; they were the products of divine conceptualisation and were not directly observable by the human senses (Vegetti 2000, 218-9; Ross 1993).
During the medieval period in Europe, the Church introduced a new philosophical approach, which combined Christian theology with ancient Greek metaphysics. On one hand, the Church promoted the teachings of Christianity as these were passed on by the Evangelists and the Fathers of the Christian Faith. On the other hand, it interacted with ancient Greek philosophical traditions and their methodologies in order to build the foundations of the Christian doctrine based on science (episteme). At that time, the Christian doctrine needed to be armed with ‘scientific’ arguments against those who questioned it through heresy (Windelband and Heimsoeth 2005, 40-50; Kenny 2006).
The Church’s approach was originally based of Plato’s Theory of the Ideas. To a certain degree, Plato’s Ideas coincided with Aristotle’s universal (or ‘catholic’) concepts, which were explained in his Metaphysics. The Church’s aim was to produce a new universal concept, which defined the primordial, and hence perfect, essence of the entire world. Of course, this joint approach was rather abstract and the final outcome was already pre-determined: the only universal concept or Idea, which was perfect and included all other individual concepts of the natural cosmos, was the Christian God. This evidence-based reasoning procedure was perfected by the philosophical movement of medieval Realism, which ‘proved’ the ontological existence of God as a primordial and universal essence (ousia) (Windelband and Heimsoeth 2005, 40-50; Kenny 2006).
The philosophical movement of Nominalism appeared during the late medieval period and stood against the ideas of Realism. The term Nominalism derived from the Latin word ‘Nomen’, which is translated as ‘Names’. Based on Aristotle’s rationale, the Nominalists suggested that there was no universal concept in nature, which defined the essence of our cosmos. By contrast, this essence was supposed to be understood solely in relation to individual concepts, which according to Aristotle, were the only true ones. Universal concepts, or in other words Aristotle’s generic or ‘catholic’ meaning categories, were in reality a total of common features noted in different individual concepts. Such universal ‘concepts’ were conventional categorisations given in plain words; therefore, they were treated as simple names instead of concepts (Windelband and Heimsoeth 2005, 40-50; Ross 1993).
Towards the end of the medieval period, the Nominalists were seen as a group of Christian ‘atheists’ and they were fought by the Church for their views. Furthermore, the debate between Realists and Nominalists was likely to had been a Christianised continuation of the debate between Aristotle and Plato on the existence of Ideas (Windelband and Heimsoeth 2005, 40-50; Ross 1993).
The principles of Nominalism by William of Ockham
William of Ockham (AD 1285-1347) was the main representative of Nominalism and can nowadays be described as a “sceptical empiricist” (Athanasopoulos 2001, 155). He argued against the Realists and suggested that their theory was in reality a misunderstanding of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. At the same time, William of Ockham diverted medieval metaphysics towards a new direction. To him, the main issue was not proving the perfect nature of God, but proving the perfect nature of God’s creations (Athanasopoulos 2001, 155-6). His ideas introduced a broader philosophical shift in medieval Europe: metaphysics turned away from studying universal concepts and focused on individual (or personalised) concepts.
The Nominalist views discussed by William of Ockham were based on the work of his predecessor, Peter of Spain, who also lived in the 13th century and wrote the Tractatus, a manual on logic. Peter of Spain separated himself from the mainstream metaphysics of the 13th century: he introduced a innovative theory, which attributed the terminology of metaphysics to language. According to his theory, the search for generic concepts was being performed with the use of dialectics, which used to be an instrument of thought-categorisation based on language. Language employed words to define terms; therefore, the terms of metaphysics were not real concepts, but plain words attributed to them by the philosophers. Instead of accepting the existence of generic and specific concepts, Peter of Spain argued that these were either words of generic meaning (significatio) or words of specific meaning (suppositio) (Athanasopoulos 2001, 157-9).
William of Ockham took over this theory and added his own thoughts. He explained that any terminology presented in words, had a specific written and oral form, which was subject to human intention. The form of each word was independent from the meaning it conveyed; therefore, the meaning of the word was expected to be the natural signifier. Every natural signifier was also described as independent of language and dialect. The concepts, on the other hand, differed in relation to the written and oral form of the words, which only described their natural signifiers in a conventional manner. All logical terms were described as conventional, and therefore, all universal concepts were equally conventional. Furthermore, William of Ockham noted that universal concepts were subject to the cultural beliefs and views of the people producing them. By following this rationale, he concluded that there were no generic concepts, but individual concepts, which consisted of specific meanings. In the same sense, there were no universal concept categories, as these were plain words or plain creations of the human intellect. The only real and acceptable concepts were those which were specific, and therefore, they were individual or personalised (Athanasopoulos 2001, 157-9).
William of Ockham rejected the functionality of universal concepts due to their subjectivity and inaccuracy; however, he did not reject their existence. One is likely to say that his attitude towards such universal concepts was rather diplomatic. According to his approach, the scientific discipline that used to examine the world was divided in two sub-fields of pragmatic and deductive science. Pragmatic science dealt with partially individual concepts, which consisted of living beings and were conceived by the human senses. On the other hand, deductive science produced conclusive universal concepts, which were creations of the human mind and were conventionally described in words (terms). William of Ockham suggested that a true scientist was obliged to follow both approaches at the same time. He was expected to use the pragmatic approach to observe the phenomena, and the deductive approach to produce generic conclusions (Athanasopoulos 2001, 159).
William of Ockham’s intentions to undermine universal concepts were perceived by the Catholic Church as an attempt to undermine the true essence of God. Most likely, William of Ockham never had this intention; instead, the rejection of universal concepts as a genericised dogma was probably intended to undermine the power of the Pope, who was regarded infallible and exercised full control over all forms of medieval thought. At the end, William of Ockham was excommunicated and was forced to revoke his views under the pressure of the Catholic Church (Athanasopoulos 2001, 155). Based on this observation, one can argue that the Nominalist ideas were unable to divert the attachment of Ecclesiastical thought to metaphysics, the theories of which were also aligned with Papal authority.
The views of Empiricism
During the medieval period, Nominalism was treated as heresy and was broadly rejected, along with the ideas of William of Ockham. Furthermore, the most popular philosophical movement in Europe, Scholasticism, was still attached to the philosophical principles of classical antiquity (Windelband and Heimsoeth 2003, 101); therefore, it never interacted with the views of Nominalism, as these stood against Aristotle.
William of Ockham’s views were inherited by the English Empiricists of the 17th and 18th century, who also reshaped the Nominalist approach. During that time, European Enlightenment had already cast strong doubts on metaphysics, particularly because of the way the discipline was manipulated by the Catholic Church and the Pope. In due time, philosophical thought was disengaged from the Church’s control; therefore, Ockham’s views revived. These views were picked up by John Locke (AD 1632-1704) and his successor George Berkeley (AD 1734-1753). The focus of both Empiricists was the external data conceived by the human senses, and the way this data produced abstract representations in the human mind. According to the Empiricists, the universal concepts of Nominalism coincided with the their own abstract representations; they corresponded to an esoteric process of the human mind, which used to operate under the functions of language (Windelband and Heimsoeth 2003, 233; Kenny 2006).
The theory by John Locke
John Locke was the first philosopher to deviate from the focus of Scholasticism, which until that time, was understanding the essence of the human mind. Instead, Locke focused on the initial development phases of the human mind and the mechanisms of mental function. Locke and the broader school of post-medieval Empiricism were the introducers of empirical psychology, which finally marginalised metaphysics (Molyvas 2001, 50-1; Woolhouse 2003, 136-9).
Before Empiricism, the human mind was understood according to Plato’s approach; it was believed to carry implanted Ideas of divine conception, which used to formulate a true understanding of natural reality. By contrast to this view, Locke was the first to argue that the human mind was a blank page (tabula rasa). The empirical data of the human senses was then imprinted on this blank page to formulated the human understanding of the surrounding environment (Windelband and Heimsoeth 2003, 233; Woolhouse 2003, 136-9). During this process, human experience was constructing simple notions, which represented human reality. Such simple notions were initially being recorded and codified in words. Then, the human mind would tie these words to specific impressions, objects, or meanings, and store them in the mind’s memory for future reference (Molyvas 2001, 51-3; Woolhouse 2003, 136-9).
Locke’s simple notions coincided with the specific individual concepts by William of Ockham. He suggested that simple notions were being formed solely through our empirical experiences; however, the human mind had a second mechanism that produced groupings. The human mind was receiving such simple notions and was then converting them into generic categorisations, which were larger and more abstract notions. Such abstract notions coincided with the ‘universal’ concepts described by William of Ockham. The process from specific to abstract notions was based on the recognition of individual features, which were mutually in common in both categories. In fact, Locke suggested three scenarios for the formulation of his abstract notions: firstly, the abstract notions were being produced as representative examples of the total notions; secondly, the abstract notions were being formed by the removal of specific individual qualities of the simple notions; thirdly, the abstract notions were being produced by a combination of the previous two actions (Molyvas 2001, 51-3; Woolhouse 2003, 136-9).
Both John Locke and William of Ockham would have agreed that each human being described simple notions or individual concepts in plain words. Simple notions or individual concepts were subject to linguistic conventions and the cultural environment of the person describing them. Furthermore, both philosophers would have agreed that there were specific and generic notions or concepts, which were all empirically conceived by the human senses and were rationally processed by the human mind. William of Ockham saw that the generic/universal concepts were the products of abstract thinking; Locke, on the other hand, suggested three possible scenarios for the formulation of his generic notions, which resulted after a process of mental synthesis. Both theories aimed in the rejection of ancient Greek metaphysics; however, this aim was only achieved by John Locke.
The theory by George Berkeley
George Berkeley lived during the 18th century, when Empiricism was well-established in Western philosophical thought. Although Berkeley followed Locke’s ideas, at the same time he introduced a new theory, which rejected material reality and followed the principles of Idealism. In Berkeley’s new theory, the material world was finally demoted to an optical illusion (Molyvas 2001, 56-7; Woolhouse 2003, 189-97).
According to Berkeley, human senses were unable to capture the real world and to attest the notions comprising it with certainty. The human understanding of the world did not associate with real experiences deriving from the human senses, as Locke used to believe; instead, Berkeley explained that human understanding was the product of mental processing. This processing was taking place under the influence of memory, imagination, rational thinking, emotional and sensory data (Molyvas 2001, 56-7; Woolhouse 2003, 189-97). Berkeley rejected the existence of simple notions proposed by Locke, which also meant the simultaneous rejection of all individual concepts.
Berkeley argued that the division of material properties in specific and generic categories was pointless. As human beings could not conceive the reality of these properties through their senses, humans were unable to understand matter. Following the same rationale, Berkeley suggested that the separation between specific and generic notions was equally pointless due to the same lack of understanding. In relation to this view, Berkeley followed the principles of Subjectivism by René Descartes (AD 1596-1650), who used to argue against John Locke and the early Empiricists (Molyvas 2001, 56-8; Woolhouse 2003, 189-97).
Despite this turn towards Subjectivism, Berkeley followed the standard Empirical approach, according to which, human senses used to capture ‘something’ that was external. For Berkeley, however, this ‘something’, which coincided with Locke’s specific notion, was believed to be unreal. A specific notion was never sufficient enough to contribute to the formulation of a generic notion. For Berkeley, the synthesis process suggested by Locke and the abstraction process suggested by William of Ockham, did not exist. Instead, Berkeley saw a selective process, during which the human mind was retaining certain elements from each specific notion and was consciously expelling some others. In this mechanism, the mind was forming simplified versions of each specific notion, which were meant to be stored in memory and be recalled when the mind had to deal with similar notions. Although Berkeley’s simplified notions were standardised in an abstract manner, they did not consist of universal concepts (Molyvas 2001, 56-8; Woolhouse 2003, 189-97).
In summary, George Berkeley disagreed with the views by both John Locke and William of Ockham in relation to the existence of generic notions and universal concepts. Although he followed the Empirical approach, according to which the human mind used to conceive notions after external stimuli, he described these notions as incorrect and unreal. Instead, he argued that Locke’s simple notions were the product of human language. Language used to attribute certain characteristics to these notions in plain words, which were subject to the cultural background of the speaker (Molyvas 2001, 58). The speaker could have used such linguistic conventions in a conscious way, which could have made sense to the listeners, although the communicated notions would have remained incorrect and unreal .
Summary and conclusions
The introduction of specific concepts and generic or universal concepts in medieval philosophy was based on ancient Greek philosophical traditions. Aristotle employed two categorisations of individual (cathecaston ennoies) and general or universal concepts (‘catholic’ or catholou ennoies), while Plato described his Ideas as generic concepts with universal validity. The debate between Plato and Aristotle was mirrored in the debate between Nominalists and Realists in the medieval period.
William of Ockham expanded the theory by Peter of Spain and suggested that all concepts were described in words, which were subject to language. He argued that Aristotle’s generic concepts (the ‘catholic’ or catholou) were abstract definitions of his specific individual concepts (the epimerous cathecaston), and therefore, reality was only described by the latter. Although universal concepts existed, these were seen as invalid and unreal. This rejection of the functionality of universal concepts was perceived by the Church as heresy and Ockham was finally excommunicated.
John Locke refined Ockham’s ideas and introduced them into the newly founded Empiricism of the 17th century. During that time, philosophy had moved away from the constrains of the Christian doctrine, which allowed Ockham’s ideas to be re-discussed. According to Locke, human senses used to produce simple notions, which were real; however, these were being described is plain words, the meanings of which was being determined by the human mind. Although Locke agreed that generic or universal notions existed, these were seen as the product of mental synthesis.
The existence of generic or universal notions was finally rejected by George Berkeley in the 18th century, who also doubted that Locke’s simple notions were real. He argued that each notion, specific or generic, was a linguistic convention that could not represent reality in a convincing manner; hence, the division between simple and generic notions by Locke made absolutely no sense. All notions were described as plain conventions of the human intellect, a point on which Berkeley’s approach reflected the ideas of Subjectivism by René Descartes.
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